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Language (e.g., structure, morphology, and wording) can direct our attention toward the
specific properties of an object, in turn influencing the mental representation of that same
object. In this paper, we examined this idea by focusing on a particular linguistic form
of diminution used in many languages (e.g., in Polish, Spanish, and Portuguese) to refer
to an object as being “smaller.” Interestingly, although objects are usually considered
“better” when they are bigger in size, objects described with linguistic diminution can
also refer to those that are emotionally positive. Across three experiments conducted in
Polish, we examined this lexical ambiguity in terms of mood (Experiment 1), subjective
quality and monetary value (Experiment 2), and choice selection (Experiment 3). Overall,
we found that people evaluate objects differently depending on the linguistic form (i.e.,
with or without diminution) with which they are described, and that it was related to
the perceptual representation of these objects, and not their affective status. Objects
described with diminution are evaluated as less satisfying and of lesser value and this
effect is attributed to the way participants represent the objects (i.e., encoded and
memorized). The generalizability of these effects is discussed.
Keywords: language, diminutive forms, judgments, size, satisfaction, value, cognition
INTRODUCTION
Imagine being invited to a birthday party of one of your friends. You are very excited, because you
found the one gift that you know will please him: a mug with the picture of a cat in a hat on it.
When your friend gets your present he says: “Oh! What a nice little present!” In English, there is
some ambiguity in his use of the term little. He could be possibly referring to either the physical size
(smallness) of the object (i.e., “This is a little gift”) or the affective status – in terms of how nice it
is – of it (i.e., “Such a lovely, little gift”). In other languages (e.g., Spanish or Polish), the ambiguity
in valence is much stronger, inasmuch as both meanings are very frequent when using language
cues, such as diminutive forms, referring to size (Haman, 2003).
Diminutive forms of spoken language are exceptionally common among users of many
Romance (e.g., Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian), Slavic (e.g., Polish, Czech, or Russian) and
Germanic (e.g., Dutch or German) languages. Spanish and Polish are particularly rich in their use
of diminutive suffixes, as almost any noun, adjective, or adverb can take a diminutive form [e.g.,
centav-ito or pienia˛-z˙ki (a small amount of money = moneywith diminutive) instead of centa-vo or
pienia˛-dze (money)]. As mentioned earlier, the diminutive form can signal either (a) the relative
small size of an object or (b) the speaker’s familiarity and affection toward the same object (1).
This suggests a certain level of ambiguity, in that the use of the diminutive form is not limited
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only to describing objects of smaller size or quantity. In fact,
diminutive forms are often used when describing precious and
beloved objects. For example, the diminutive form of the noun
“coin” [e.g., złotóweczka (a coinwith diminutive) instead of złotówka
(a coin)] can either suggest that it is precious, or simply that it
is smaller. In terms of the mental processes involved – and their
resulting mental representations–, determining which meaning
is dominant has yet to be empirically tested. At the very base of
this issue is the fact that the use of the diminutive forms does not
necessarily mean that the object is physically smaller.
Also, importantly, whilst in some languages (e.g., English),
linguistic diminution is rather informal and used mostly in the
context of child directed speech (doggie vs. dog; horsey vs. horse;
Burnham et al., 2002) or nicknames between friends (Maggie
vs. Margaret; Bombar and Littig, 1996), in Polish or Spanish,
diminutives are very common and are frequently used in spoken
language, even in formal settings (e.g., ratka vs. rata–a mortgage
fee; momento vs. momentito– a moment; Mendoza, 2005; Królak
and Rudnicka, 2006).
We argue that this unmarked use of diminutive nouns
when describing objects constrasts the opposite meanings of
“very small” vs. “really nice.” However, we essentially argue
that for many objects, especially those sensitive to the heuristic
bigger is better, the use of diminutive forms will predominantly
generate smaller perceptual representations. If the prevailing
interpretation of the diminutive form was to be of a physical
nature (i.e., the object is represented as being smaller), a number
of corollary processes may come into effect. Several studies
have actually found that the physical size of an object may
be used as a heuristic to process that object (Josephs et al.,
1994, 1996; Silvera et al., 2002; Meier et al., 2008). Silvera
et al. (2002), for example, showed that people, aesthetically
speaking, prefer bigger (abstract) objects. This suggests that the
size of an object acts as a multi-purpose heuristic (Bromgard
et al., 2013) and that the bigger is better rule is predominantly
used when evaluating objects. Some authors have argued this
predominance to be grounded in evolutionary processes (e.g.,
Leaky, 1971; Campbell, 1976), as it can also be observed in
the animal kingdom: social benefits are reserved for those that
can effectively increase their body size (e.g., baboons, peacocks,
cats, or porcupines; Alcock, 1984). It might have been the case
that at one point in the evolutionary process, considering bigger
things as better was a proficient way to consider the environment.
Although this is clearly not the case anymore, at least for
some objects that strive for miniaturization (e.g., electronics,
medical instruments), there might still be mental residues of these
evolutionary processes.
Regardless of these evolutionary grounds, the possibility
that language, through the use of diminutive forms, can alter
the perceptual representation of an object’s size (and possibly
subsequent processing) is reminiscent of the thinking for
speaking principle put forward by Slobin (2003). Because
language provides only a limited set of options for encoding
certain properties of objects, some linguistic forms may be
bound to certain characteristics of these objects. In turn,
when encountering these specific forms, our attention may be
inevitably and excessively directed toward these underlying
characteristics. There is ample evidence that properties of
language can potentially provide us with readily available
cues on which to base our evaluations of objects (e.g., reading
comprehension; Garner, 1987; framing effects; Kahneman
and Tversky, 1973, 1996; priming effects; Neely, 1977;
Higgins et al., 1985; Semin, 2008; Boroditsky, 2009), or
even our evaluation of people in terms of gender (e.g., Sato
et al., 2013). In other words, language shapes our mental
representations, regardless of comprehenders’ processing
dispositions.
However, we do not argue that the use of the diminutive form
will influence perception per se, (i.e., visual input information that
participants actually perceive are exactly the same regardless of
the description), but more the way the objects are represented,
that is, encoded and memorized. Some authors, such as Lupyan
(2012, 2015) and Lupyan and Ward (2013), have argued
that lower-level operations could be influenced by higher-
level cognitive contexts such as language (Goldstone, 1995;
Levin and Banaji, 2006; Lupyan and Spivey, 2008; Lupyan
et al., 2010), yet we believe that these authors may have
overestimated the extent to which top-down processes could
influence perception, as rightly put forward recently by Firestone
and Scholl (2014, 2015). Firestone and Scholl (2015) argued that
it is unlikely that cognition affects the way we see the world.
It may affect other higher-level processes, such as encoding
or memory, but not perception per se. So, for example, they
argue that the fact that wearing heavy backpacks makes hills
look steeper (Bhalla and Proffitt, 1999) is only an artifact of
the experimental demand. If participants are given a rationale
for wearing a heavy backpack (e.g., carying heavy monitoring
equipment, as in Durgin et al., 2009), the effect disappears. As
interesting as these effects are, we do not wish to address this
controversial debate here, as it goes beyond the scope of this
paper.
We mainly wish to argue that the linguistic forms under
investigation in this paper will have an effect on the way the
perceived objects will be mentally processed, that is, encoded
and memorized. What we do not know, though, is the way our
cognitive system may deal with the ambiguity resulting from
the use of diminutive forms (i.e., “very small” vs. “really nice”).
Accessing perceivers’ mental representations when processing
these forms should enlighten us in this matter.
Bigger Is Better, Smaller Is Less Positive
The notion that people often make judgments under uncertainty
based on a small number of simplifying strategies (i.e., heuristics),
rather than on all available information, or extensive algorithmic
processing, is undisputed (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973, 1996;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1986; Kahneman, 2000; Gilovich
et al., 2002; Kahneman, 2003). For example, when making
qualitative judgments about objects, people often use simple and
apparent contextual cues, such as the objects’ physical size, when
indicating aesthetic preferences (Josephs et al., 1994, 1996; Silvera
et al., 2002).
In fact, perceptual properties, such as physical size, are often
part of the mental representations that are partially based on
the same system as conceptual knowledge (Barsalou, 1999; Shen
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et al., 2016). Shen et al. (2016), for example, showed that when
presenting a pair of words referring to objects of different sizes
(e.g., grape – watermelon), participants were more accurate (and
faster, in Experiment 3b) when judging if one of the objects
was smaller or bigger than the other if the object was written
in a congruent font size (i.e., bigger font for a bigger object).
Importantly, the effect was only present if participants were
forced to semantically process the words. In our case, and
following the bigger is better principle, if the diminutive form
is processed as a cue for the physical size of an object (i.e., it is
smaller), we believe that the mental (conceptual and/or semantic)
representations of that object will include the notion that it is of
lesser value.
The Present Paper
Thus, in the current paper, we examine three issues. First,
we explore whether a diminutive form (in Polish), even
if its interpretation can be ambiguous, is an exploited
cue for the physical size of a described object. If it is,
regardless of the pragmatic intentions associated with the use
of the diminutive form, it may be perceived as something
rather negative (i.e., smaller is less positive than bigger).
Second, we examine whether the resulting perceptual mental
representation has an impact on (a) the satisfaction of a person
receiving an object described with the diminutive form, (b)
the subjective quality of that object and (c) its pecuniary
value. Third, we investigated whether diminutive labels of
objects, through their constructed mental representations, could
influence selection processes of exemplars differing in their actual
size.
Consequently, the goal of the present paper was twofold:
to demonstrate the influence of a linguistic cue (a) on the
perceptual representation of an object and consequently (b) on
various qualitative judgments of that object. More precisely,
we hypothesize that the ambiguity associated with the use of
a diminutive form is resolved taking size as the predominant
criterion. On that account, people are less satisfied when receiving
a single gift described with the diminutive form than when
it is described normally (Experiment 1). We also hypothesize
that pieces of clothing are judged to be of lesser value when
described using the diminutive form (Experiment 2), and, finally,
in Experiment 3, we examined the generalizability of the effect of
the diminutive form on the perceptual representation of objects.
EXPERIMENT 1: RECEIVING A GIFT
Receiving an unexpected gift should quite naturally improve one’s
mood (Bohner et al., 1992).Yet, its linguistic presentation form
might directly impact the extent of this impact. If the diminutive
form is taken as a cue for physical size, we expect recipients’ mood
to be less positive, whereas if the diminutive form is taken as a
clue for its affective value, we expect recipients’ mood to improve.
Inherent to the former expectation, we were also interested in the
perceptual representation recipients may build when the coin is
described with the diminutive form. Therefore, in Experiment 1,
we examined whether the linguistic form of the object’s name
given as a gift – a 1 Polish złoty coin worth approximately 32
cents – would lead to different satisfaction levels in the recipient
as well as different perceptual representations.
Method
Participants
Forty undergraduate students at the library of the University of
Gdansk, Poland (25 women; Mage = 22.6, SD = 2.6) took part in
this experiment. The experiment was approved by the university’s
ethics committee, and all participants had granted their written
informed consent after the experiment.
Design and Procedure
In this experiment, there were two conditions associated with the
form in which the Polish złoty coin was presented: Diminutive
vs. Regular form. Participants’ mood was measured 3 min after
receiving the gift, as was done in Study 1A by Wilson et al. (2005).
During the experiment, an experimenter approached
participants one at a time in the university library. Participants
were initially given a card on which a Polish złoty coin was
attached, with a simple “Hi! This is for you, have a nice day”
greeting. After handing a card to a participant, the experimenter
would walk away, as if they were trying to find somebody
else to whom they could give the next card. Participants
were randomly assigned to receive the złoty coin in one
of two experimental conditions: a coin was attached to a
paper card describing it in the diminutive (“złotóweczka” –
small coin) or in its regular form (“złotówka” – a regular
coin). We decided, as for all the experiments presented
in this paper, to have Form (diminutive vs. regular) as a
between factor, to avoid having any potential effect due to
some pragmatic process (i.e., “If I am given something in the
diminutive form now, it is because I can assume that it is
smaller”).
Each version of the card was identical (726 mm × 127 mm,
printed in color on a paper weighing 170 g/m2). At the top
of the card it said “This złotóweczka/złotówka is for you!” and
underneath, as in Wilson et al.’s (2005) procedure, it stated “Who
are we? A student society” and “Why do we do this? We promote
random acts of kindness.” In the upper right-hand corner, there
was a yellow smiley face, and at the bottom of card, the phrase
“Have a nice day” was placed.
Meanwhile, a second experimenter (unaware of the
experimental conditions the participants were in) observed
the scene from a distance, and, exactly 3 min after the
first experimenter handed the card to a participant, they
approached them and asked if the participants could fill out
a questionnaire for their class project. The first part of the
questionnaire consisted of some demographic questions, a
general question about current positive and negative mood
(“How POSITIVE or NEGATIVE is your mood right now?”),
and six affective labels (joyful, pleased, frustrated, confused,
alert, and agitated). Students answered questions about
their mood on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = very negative to
9 = very positive), and on the six affective labels [1 = don’t
feel (label) at all to 9 = feel (label) a lot]. The second part
of the questionnaire focused directly on our experimental
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manipulation. The experimenter therefore told the participants
that the next set of questions were directly related to them
receiving the coin. Whilst he masked the card, he asked each
participant to complete the questionnaire, which was composed
of several questions assessing the participants’ attention to
the card (e.g., “Have you read the card carefully?”, “Since
receiving the card, to what extent have you wondered why
you received it?”) and questions assessing the experimental
manipulation per se (e.g., What was the linguistic form used?).
Participants answered the attention questions on a 9-point
Likert scale (1 = not at all to 9 = very carefully). At the very
end of the session, participants were asked to draw the size
of the coin (without looking at it) and were asked if they
had any clue about what hypothesis was being tested in this
experiment (i.e., “What do you think was the real purpose of this
study?”).
Results and Discussion
All affective measures were assessed separately, and comparisons
between the two experimental conditions were made by
conducting independent t-tests when the sample distributions
were normal, and Mann–Whitney tests when the sample
distributions were not normal.
Out of the six affective scales, joy, as illustrated by the
beanplots in Figure 1, showed a significant difference between
those who received the złoty coin presented in its diminutive
form (M = 5.55, SD = 2.16, CI [4.54–6.56]) and those who
received the coin in its regular form (M = 6.90, SD = 1.52, CI
[6.19–7.61], U(38)= 120.50, Z =−2.21, p= 0.03).
Participants who received the złoty coin presented in its
diminutive form, as shown in the beanplots in Figure 1, on
average, drew the coin as smaller than its actual (2.3 cm in
diameter) size (M= 2.05 cm, SD= 0.38, CI [−0.43 –−0.07]), but
it was only numerically different from the złoty coin presented
in its regular form (M = 2.19 cm, SD = 0.31, CI [−0.25 –
−0.04], t(38) = 1.32; p = 0.19). When directly comparing the
two conditions, the difference did not reach significance. In fact,
participants who received a coin described in the regular form
also drew it smaller than the actual coin (yet not as small). In
itself, this is not surprising, as people are quite bad at reproducing
items, even when they have often been exposed to them (e.g.,
Blake et al., 2015).
Participants who received the złoty coin presented in its
diminutive form also declared having read the card more
carefully (M= 8.30, SD= 0.92, CI [7.86 – 8.73]) than participants
who received the złoty coin presented in its regular form
(M = 7.25, SD = 1.48, CI [6.55 – 7.94], U(38) = 117.00,
Z = −2.26, p = 0.02). This effect could illustrate the fact
that participants noticed the diminutive form, yet they failed
to uncover the purpose of the experiment, as indicated by the
responses to the final question.
This first experiment suggests that the linguistic form of an
object had an impact on the related mood of the participants. This
effect is quite fascinating, inasmuch as the coin received is well
known and frequently used. People are exposed to it on a daily
basis. However, since its actual value is set, we cannot truly extend
our findings to saying that the diminutive form also has an effect
on the perceived value of the object. We therefore conducted
Experiment 2 to examine this idea.
EXPERIMENT 2: VALUE OF A PRODUCT
The aim of Experiment 2 was to determine if the use of a
diminutive form of an object could affect how people evaluate
its quality and pecuniary value. If the effect found in Experiment
1 held true even for an (supposedly) objective evaluation, it
would provide us with strong support that linguistic forms have
considerable implications as to the way we mentally represent
objects.
In this experiment, to avoid fixed values (i.e., a złoty coin is
always worth the same amount) we used a more applied setting:
an online auction. This choice is also supported by the fact that,
at Polish auctions, sellers frequently use diminutive forms in the
descriptions of their objects, even if the objects are clearly full-
sized (e.g., big SUV cars presented as autko – a carwith diminutive).
This suggests that some sellers strategically want to highlight the
emotional value of their objects (i.e., “it used to be my favorite
car”) whilst underestimating the meaning of smallness they might
convey. In essence, in this experiment, we investigated whether
this is a good strategy or not.
Method
Participants
Ninety-eight participants (48 women; Mage = 24.70, SD = 5.37)
recruited online via an educational website took part in this
experiment, in exchange for being entered in a raﬄe to
win educational books. The experiment was approved by the
university’s ethics committee, and all participants had granted
their written informed consent before starting the experiment.
Design and Procedure
As in Experiment 1, there were two conditions associated with
the form in which the items were presented: Diminutive vs.
Regular form, and participants rated their mood after having
received a złoty coin. In this experiment, participants’ judgments
of the monetary value, as well as their evaluation of the pieces of
clothing for auction were measured.
Six pictures of new pieces of clothing (i.e., a man’s
coat, a woman’s sweater, a man’s tracksuit, women’s shoes,
men’s sunglasses and a woman’s jacket) were selected for the
experiment. All items were presented as if they were for sale
on a simulated website that mirrored the most popular Polish
online auction website (allegro.pl, which operates similarly to
ebay.com). In actual fact, all six items had been for sale before,
at the exact price of 150 PLN. All pictures were digitally altered to
hide any visible trademarks. All item descriptions were matched
to each other in terms of word count and number of characteristic
features. Before the actual evaluation of the items, participants’
mood was measured using two positive and two negative mood
items (Wojciszke and Baryła, 2005). This was done to ensure
that any potential evaluation variance was attributable to the use
of the diminutive form and not to a possible mood effect (i.e.,
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FIGURE 1 | Beanplots1 (with means, and standard deviations in brackets) of joy and coin size as a function of the linguistic form the coins were
presented in.
merely seeing an object written in the diminutive form alters one’s
mood).
Forty-seven randomly chosen participants were redirected
to a questionnaire describing the items of clothing in a
diminutive form (eg. płaszcz-yk (coatwith diminutive); dres-ik
(tracksuitwith diminutive), and the remaining 51 participants were
redirected to a questionnaire describing the items of clothing
in a regular form (e.g., płaszcz, dres). Participants read the item
descriptions, inspected the accompanying pictures, and answered
three questions concerning each item. Two questions pertained to
the value of the presented item of clothing (“What do you think
the ‘buy now’ price would be”? and“What is the minimum price
the seller would be willing to accept for this item?”; both answers
were given in Polish złoty) and a single question addressed the
credibility of the auction itself (“Does the actual condition of the
clothing match the provided description?”), evaluated on a 7-point
Likert scale (1= absolutely not credible to 7= absolutely credible).
After participants judged all six of the products, their mood was
evaluated again and we probed them for suspicions about our
hypothesis. Three of the participants presented with descriptions
in the diminutive form noticed that the clothing names were
presented in a diminutive form, yet they displayed no suspicion
about the nature of our study. They were therefore included in
the analyses.
Results and Discussion
Judgments across all six objects were collapsed into indices of
both price judgments and auction credibility (Buy now price:
Cronbachs’α = 0.83; Minimum price: α = 0.77; Credibility:
1A beanplot is a combination between a scatter plot and a density distribution
trace (for details, see Kampstra, 2008). In a nutshell, a density function (Kernel
density estimation in our case) describes the relative likelihood of certain values.
As such, they provide us with an estimation of the distribution likelihood that any
sample of the drawn population would take. The beanplots were generated using
the R software (R Core Team, 2013) and the beanplot function from the beanplot
package (Kampstra, 2008).
α= 0.66). As in Experiment 1, we compared the two experimental
conditions for each measurement (i.e., each dependent variable)
by conducting independent t-tests when the sample distributions
were normal, and Mann–Whitney tests when the sample
distributions were not normal.
Buy Now Price
As predicted, and as illustrated by the beanplots in Figure 2, there
was a main effect of the linguistic form used, U(96) = 869.50,
Z = −2.34, p = 0.02; indicating that participants who read the
diminutive form descriptions of the items attributed less value to
them (M = 124.82; SD = 46.49, CI [111.17–138.47]) than those
who read the regular form descriptions (M = 151.24; SD= 78.54,
CI [129.15 – 173.33]). In a similar way as for the złoty coin
size in Experiment 1, given that we knew the actual price paid
for the depicted items of clothing, we also ran a one-sample
Wilcoxon sign test comparing the means for both groups to the
fixed value (150 złoties). Participants who read the diminutive
form descriptions were significantly (p < 0.001) less accurate in
their judgments of the buy now price, whilst those who read the
regular form descriptions estimated the price more in accordance
with their real market value.
Minimum Price
As seen in Figure 2, the same pattern of results emerged from
the participants’ judgments of the items’ minimum price: a
predicted main effect of the linguistic form used, U(96)= 863.00,
Z = −2.81, p < 0.01, meaning that participants who read the
diminutive form descriptions indicated lower prices (M = 83.82
Polish złoty; SD = 37.30, CI [72.86–94.77]) than those who
read the regular form descriptions (M = 112.40 Polish złoty;
SD= 69.70, CI [92.79– 131.99]).
Auction’s Credibility and Participants’ Mood
There was no significant difference as to the items’ credibility
[U(96) = 1123.00, Z = −0.538, ns] nor was there a difference
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FIGURE 2 | Beanplots (with means, and standard deviations in brackets) of buy now price and minimum price as a function of the linguistic form the
coins were presented in.
in terms of mood [U(96) = 1171.00, Z = −0.193, ns], suggesting
that the effects found were entirely attributable to the linguistic
forms used, and to their impact upon quality and monetary value
attributions.
In all, we found that the diminutive form influenced the
participants’ evaluations of the objects to be sold. Taken together
with the results from Experiment 1, using diminutive forms
(instead of the regular form) to describe an object led to less
satisfaction when receiving the object as a gift (Experiment 1),
and to a smaller monetary value when it was to be sold on an
online auction website (Experiment 2).
Inherent to both Experiments 1 and 2, however, is the
assumption that the diminutive form, as mentioned in the
introduction, is associated to the mental processing of size.
Although we do believe this to be true, we have yet
to directly show the direct effect of the diminutive on
perceptual representations (other than the coin measurement
in Experiment 1). In addition to this, although there was
a variety of stimuli in the two experiments reported so far,
the question of generalizability remains. In both experiments,
only by-participant analyses were performed, leaving by-item
generalizability to assumptions. In this final experiment, we
directly tested the effect of the diminutive form on perceptual
representations by asking participants to select a sample of
items (fruits and vegetables), either written in the regular or the
diminutive form, from a set of size varying choices.
EXPERIMENT 3: SELECTING FROM
FRUITS AND VEGETABLES OF
DIFFERENT SIZES
The purpose of our final experiment was threefold. First, we
wanted to make sure that the effects we obtained in the previous
experiments were driven by perceptual representations. Since we
did not directly test this (except from the drawings in Experiment
1), those effects obtained in all experiments could be attributed to
alternative processes. For example, one could argue that objects
in the diminutive form may simply be considered as “more
negative,” hence dissociated from any perceptual representation.
The consequent effects would be similar to those observed. We
therefore decided to manipulate the size of the items (i.e., fruits
and vegetables) presented to participants and engage them in
a direct and explicit exemplar comparison and selection task,
whereby we hypothesized that participants’ comparisons and
selections would be dependent upon the grammatical form
the items were presented in. In this experiment, we therefore
presented participants with items of different sizes, and asked
them to carefully inspect them and select a sample of them.
Second, we wanted to examine the item generalizability of the
perceptual effects of the diminutive form. We therefore increased
our item sample (N = 20) to include a wide variety of fruits and
vegetables and ran both by-participant and by-item analyses. Last
but not least, we wanted to keep the task at hand as ecological
as possible. We therefore constructed a grocery task, in which
participants had to pick some fruits and vegetables, as if they were
participating in a grocery shopping assessment survey. By having
this ecological cover story, we ensured that our manipulation was
hidden from the participants.
Method
Participants
Four hundred and six participants (343 women; Mage = 23.2,
SD = 7,5) recruited online via an educational website took
part in this experiment, in exchange for being entered in a
raﬄe to win educational books. One female participant had
to be removed from the analyses due to incomplete data. The
experiment was approved by the university’s ethics committee,
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and all participants had granted their written informed consent
before starting the experiment.
Materials
In this experiment, we presented participants with 20 box
containers, each comprising nine exemplars, varying in size, of
a fruit or a vegetable2 (e.g., one box had nine white onions).
As explained in detail later, participants, for each fruit or
vegetable, had to pick three exemplars. In this experiment,
and mimicking Experiments 1 and 2, we wanted to make
sure that our task of selecting fruits or vegetables was as
ecological as possible (see Figure 3, for an example of a box
containing mushrooms and lemons). There were two important
methodological consequences to this drive for ecological validity.
First, we decided to use one (picture of a) single box container
(size: 60 cm × 40 cm × 22 cm) in which to present the
objects, to mirror product presentation at fruit and vegetable
markets. By doing so, we generated a very salient cover story,
inducing participants into thinking that they were participating
in a grocery shopping assessment survey (i.e., distracting from
any explicit notice of the use, in one task, of the diminutive form).
Second, we presented fruits and vegetables that were reasonable
in size and perceptually realistic. Consequently, there were,
naturally, smaller (i.e., white onions) as well as bigger ones (e.g.,
celeries). As the differences in sizes within the nine exemplars
of each fruit or vegetable was constant across types of fruits
or vegetables, we expected size differences between exemplars
of bigger fruits or vegetables to be more difficult to perceive
than those of smaller fruits or vegetables. For smaller fruits or
vegetables, a bigger proportion of the actual size changed between
the exemplars. Since, we were expecting that the diminutive
form could affect the perceptual representations of the fruits and
vegetables, we separated our items into smaller and bigger fruits
or vegetables in all analyses, expecting our effects to be smaller
for the bigger fruits or vegetables, as the relative size difference
is less perceptually profound. Note that there were no differences
between fruits and vegetables, hence we did not treat item nature
(i.e., fruit vs. vegetable) as a factor.
Procedure
To encourage participants to believe that the whole task was
about their grocery shopping habits, we first asked participants
two questions pertaining to these habits (i.e., “How often
do you shop” and “For how many persons do you shop”).
After having responded to these questions and to ensure that
participants would notice the labels (i.e., for some participants
with the diminutive form) and read them carefully (ensuring
2The 20 objects we used in Experiment 3 were: apricots (morelki vs. morele),
beetroots (buraczki vs. buraki), carrots (marchewki vs. marchew), lemons
(cytrynki vs. cytryny), green apples (zielone jabłuszka vs. jabłka), red apples
(czerwone jabluszka vs. jabłka), gurkens (ogóreczki vs. ogórki), yellow peppers
(z˙ółte papryczki vs. papryki), red peppers (czerwone papryczki vs. papryki),
oranges (pomarañczki vs. pomarañcze), long tomatoes (podłuz˙ne pomidorki vs.
pomidory), round tomatoes (okra˛głe pomidorki vs. pomidory), yellow onions
(z˙ółte cebulki vs. cebule), white onions (białe cebulki vs. cebule), peaches
(brzoskwinki vs. brzoskwinie), pears (gruszeczki vs. gruszki), yellow plums (z˙ółte
s´liweczki vs. s´liwki), violet plums (fioletowe s´liweczki vs. s´liwki), celery (selerki vs.
selery), and mushrooms (pieczareczki vs. pieczarki).
FIGURE 3 | Examples of stimulus used in Experiment 3. (A) Presents
objects in diminutive form while (B) presents the regular form of the label.
Also, two methods of numbering the objects (counterbalanced between
participants) were used: Top Panel presents vertical numbering, while Bottom
Panel presents horizontal numbering of fruits and vegetables.
the activation of any processes associated to language form), we
had an initial sorting task in which participants had to simply
match six randomly chosen fruit or vegetable labels with their
corresponding pictures. The labels were written in the same way
as for the experimental task. Although this pre-task was aimed at
ensuring proper attention to the labels, it also further supported
our cover story.
In the experimental task, participants were then randomly
presented with a series of 20 boxes, one at a time, each containing
nine fruits or vegetables3. At the bottom of each box, the name of
the fruit or the vegetable, in the diminutive (for 196 participants)
or the regular form (for 210 participants), was written, along with
a price (constant across language form), as is habitually done
at grocery markets (Figure 3). Participants were simply asked
to choose three exemplars as they would do when shopping for
groceries. Each fruit in the box was marked with a number (also
counterbalancing between two methods of numbering objects),
and participants had to simply type three numbers in and proceed
to the next fruit or vegetable. At the end of the task, we asked
participants to type in what the experiment was about. None of
the participants guessed the right hypothesis.
3To decide on the actual size of each exemplar of the 20 fruits or vegetables, we
calculated the actual surface (in pixels) of each fruit or vegetable using ImageJ 1.48v
Software. Variations between fruits or vegetables within a box of nine exemplars
were on average of 994 pixel square (approximately 69 mm2).
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Results
Data Preparation
When proceeding with the analyses, we realized that there
was one perceptual issue that we did not foresee. If, as we
expected, participants make judgments based on the perceptual
size properties of the fruits and vegetables, we cannot be sure as
to the actual perceptual base for making these judgments. In other
terms, we cannot be sure that participants use the actual size, in
terms of surface (as we measured in pixel square), in terms of
width, or in terms of height of the fruits and vegetables. In fact,
participants’ perceptual frame of reference may vary from one
vegetable (e.g., using the width for a carrot sitting horizontally)
to another (e.g., using the height for an onion). To avoid making
such a decision ourselves and using a perceptual frame that might
not be correct for a particular fruit or vegetable, we conducted
an extra experiment to determine an appropriate measure of
perceptual size.
In this extra experiment, we asked 53 participants, via an
online questionnaire, to rank, for each fruit and vegetable that
we used in the experiment, the nine related exemplars from the
smallest to the biggest one. As the task was quite resourceful
and time consuming, we asked the participants to only evaluate
10 randomly selected fruits or vegetables out of the 20 (yet
counterbalanced so that we had all fruits or vegetables ranked
at least 26 times). After having ranked the nine exemplars of
a fruit or vegetable, participants had to evaluate (using a slider
anchored from 1 = very easy to 21 = very difficult), how
difficult the task was, as well as how sure they were of their
ranking (from 1 = not sure to 21 = very sure). Importantly,
and confirming our expectations regarding bigger and smaller
fruits or vegetables, bigger fruits or vegetables were more difficult
to rank, t(18) = 2.64, p < 0.054 (smaller fruits or vegetables:
M = 11.80, SD = 1.88; bigger ones: M = 9.48, SD = 2.05). For
the purpose of subsequent analyses, we calculated, for each single
exemplar of a fruit or vegetable, its mean position within the nine
related exemplars (i.e., one being the smallest, and nine being
the biggest). For example, one particular cucumber would have a
mean of 2.2, suggesting that it was ranked mostly at the second
position (i.e., the second smallest cucumber). Our dependent
variable was henceforth this perceptual-rank score (Figure 4),
and we used this perceptual rank-score as the dependent variable
in all subsequent analyses.
Analyses
To examine whether the diminutive form had an impact on the
way participants represented the fruits and vegetables, henceforth
affecting the selection of the three exemplars, we conducted
a 2 (Actual Size: Smaller vs. Bigger) × 2 (Language: Regular
vs. Diminutive) mixed ANOVA, with Actual Size as a within-
participant factor and Language as a between-participant factor
in the by-participant analyses, and Actual Size as a between-
item factor and Language as a within-item factor in the by-
item analyses. In this experiment, all sample distributions were
normal.
4Quite logically, the easier a fruit or vegetable was to rank, the more certain the
participants were to be right, r(20)= 0.96, p < 0.001.
Overall, there was only one effect that reached significance
both by participants and by items: An Actual Size by Language
interaction, F1(1,403)= 4.62, p= 0.03, F2(1,18)= 8.92, p < 0.01.
As shown in Figure 2, the effect of language form was only
apparent in smaller fruits or vegetables (i.e., those easier to
perceive in terms of size changes) [smaller fruits or vegetables:
t1(403)= 2.04; p < 0.05, t2(9)= 3.17; p= 0.04 with Bonneferoni
correction; bigger fruits or vegetables: t1(403) = −0.50; ns,
t2(9)=−0.77; ns]5.
Discussion
In this experiment, we directly tested the perceptual
representations generated by the use of the diminutive form
by asking participants to select a sample of fruits or vegetables.
As expected, when written in the diminutive form, participants
did select smaller exemplars. Importantly, we decided to
mask the purpose of the experiment from the participants by
convincing them that they were participating in a realistic grocery
shopping assessment survey. One of our primary purposes was
to examine the item generalizability (and not only participant
generalizability as in Experiments 1 and 2) of the perceptual
representation effects due to the use of diminutive forms, and
although we showed that this effect was generalizable, it is only
true when fruit or vegetable size differences are perceptually
easy to recognize. More specifically, in our experiment, to keep
a realistic and ecologically valid manipulation, we decided to
manipulate size by constant differences (in mm2) across all fruits
or vegetables. Had we manipulated size by targeting proportional
differences (i.e., a certain proportion of any fruit), we would have
had similar effects across all fruits or vegetables. Yet, considering
the constraining factor of the box container – and to keep it
realistic –, this was not possible. As a matter of fact, in retrospect,
we do not feel that this is a problem, inasmuch as this issue
even substantiates our argument that the diminutive form is
associated to perceptual representations: when it is difficult to
perceive size differences between a bigger and a smaller item,
the effect of the diminutive form is absent. Note that although
we cannot truly rule out the idea that the diminutive form may
trigger an effect of valence (i.e., diminutive = negative), it is now
hard to deny that the diminutive form is associated to perceptual
representations (including encoding, memory,. . .).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across three experiments, we demonstrated that people mentally
process objects differently when these objects are presented in
a diminutive form than when they are presented in the regular
form. That is, although the physical properties of the objects
remained constant across conditions in Experiments 1 and 2,
the objects were mentally processed differently depending on the
linguistic form (i.e., with or without the diminutive form) in
5There was also a main effect of Actual Size, yet only significant when participants
were considered as a random effect, but not when items were, F1(1,403) = 73.42,
p < 0.05, F2(1,18) = 4.24, p < 0.06. Note that this effect is interesting in itself,
as it suggests that when fruits or vegetables have to be chosen from bigger ones,
participants tend to go for the slightly smaller ones.
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FIGURE 4 | Beanplots (with means and standard deviations in brackets) of the mean perceptual-rank scores of the three chosen fruits or vegetables
in Experiment 3, according to Actual Size and Language Form.
which they were presented. People were less satisfied with having
received the objects (Experiment 1) and mentally processed the
objects as less valuable (Experiment 2). When the objects (here
fruits or vegetables) varied in size, smaller ones were more often
selected when described in a diminutive form (Experiment 3). In
Experiment 1, participants’ mood after receiving a gift was lower
when the gift was presented in the diminutive form than when
presented in the regular form. In Experiment 2, various pieces of
clothing were valued as being cheaper when they were presented
in the diminutive form than when presented in the regular form.
Finally, the results of Experiment 3 demonstrate that the effects
under investigation are truly associated to size representation
and are generalizable not only across participants, but also across
items.
Note that the reported perceptual effects of diminutives are
reminiscent of El Greco’s fallacy (Firestone and Scholl, 2014). The
El Greco fallacy refers to a false interpretation of the artworks
of a famous painter of the Spanish Renaissance, who had a
signature technique in reproducing human portraits as being
oddly elongated. Art historians in the early 1900s suggested
that his technique must have been the result of his strongely
distorted vision. It was assumed that he must have been a suferer
of severe astigmatism and he was merely painting exactly how
he saw the world. In fact this cannot possibly be true, but it
took almost a century to falsify this interpretatation. Had this
interpretation been true, El Greco would have seen his canvases
distorted in the same way (i.e., elongated canvases), and painting
onto them would have canceled out any true visual distortion.
Thus, as mentioned in the introduction, we do not believe that
the diminutive form directly affects perception, or vision, as the
results of Experiment 3 would be very different if this was the
case. That is, if the diminutive form resulted in (all) the objects
being seen as smaller, participants would have picked actual
bigger fruits and vegetables (i.e., not noticing that they were the
big ones).
Still, altogether, we showed that (a) the diminutive form is
spontaneously processed as illustrative of an object size, and (b)
that its resulting represented size is used as a heuristic cue on
which to base different evaluative processes. Consequently, our
results raise several issues. First, they demonstrate that subtle
language differences can have a significant impact upon the
perceived properties of objects, supporting Slobin’s (2003) idea
that language shapes our representations. Although very little
research has been conducted on the impact of diminutive forms
upon mental representations, our results clearly complement
previous research on the more general influence of language on
cognitive processes (Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Maass and Russo,
2003; Winawer et al., 2007; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008;
Fiedler, 2008; Boroditsky, 2011; Lupyan, 2012).
Similarly to the use of diminutive forms to refer to objects,
these forms can ambiguously refer to size as well as to affection
(Haman, 2003; Kray et al., 2012). Since physical size has actually
been shown to be considered as a cue for social status (Campbell,
1976; Schubert et al., 2013), referring to human beings using
diminutive forms could generate conflicting representations,
which in turn, could be grounded on social dimensions (such
as sexism, for example). Future studies should address the
hypothesis of examining the influence of diminutive forms when
addressing other people (Merkel et al., 2012; Formanowicz et al.,
2013).
Second, our results also support the idea that, for several
evaluative dimensions, size does matter. Although it might no
longer be the case, some authors (e.g., Leaky, 1971) have argued
that, in evolutionary terms, the size of objects may have been
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a very useful heuristic in preference judgments. The heuristic
“bigger is better,” which we believe is at the heart of the effects in
the first two experiments, may still be used as a cue for preference.
Some would argue that, at present, many objects of smaller size
are commonly preferred (e.g., computers, phones or microchips),
suggesting that the heuristic “smaller is better” can also be learnt
(Silvera et al., 2002). Future studies should address this. For
example, activating the “smaller is better” heuristic as the point
of reference may actually reverse the pattern of results found in
the present series of experiments.
CONCLUSION
The current research emphasizes the importance of language
forms when describing objects. The names of objects described
using the diminutive form are interpreted very differently than
when described in the regular form. This is true in terms of the
resulting mood when receiving an object as much as the quality
evaluation of the objects. Since size does seem to matter, the use
of diminutive forms can truly undermine the qualitative value of
objects.
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